

Panpsychism versus Pantheism, Polytheism, and Cosmopsychism

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Abstract

Panpsychism says that phenomenality is everywhere. Pantheism says that divinity is everywhere. These views appear parallel initially and that is why they are often contrasted or conflated. I argue, however, that panpsychism is not exactly parallel to pantheism. Panpsychism says that phenomenality is everywhere throughout the cosmos because *everything in the cosmos* is phenomenal while pantheism says that divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos because *the cosmos as a whole* is divine. We cannot, therefore, derive pantheism merely by replacing phenomenality with divinity in panpsychism. What we can derive by replacing phenomenality with divinity in panpsychism is (an extreme form of) polytheism, according to which divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos because everything in the cosmos is divine. On the other hand, if we replace divinity with phenomenality in pantheism we can derive cosmopsychism, according to which phenomenality is everywhere throughout the cosmos because the cosmos as a whole is phenomenal. In this essay, I analyse the relationships between these four views. I argue that, based on this analysis, we can develop a new way of undercutting the combination problem, which is widely considered the greatest challenge for panpsychism.

1. Introduction

Philosophers of mind have long debated the relationship between the mind and the body. Philosophers of religion have long debated the relationship between God and the cosmos. On the face of it, there is no link between these debates in two distinct areas of philosophy. However, at a certain level they are structurally parallel and the contrast between them can be useful for making philosophical progress.¹ In this essay, I discuss and utilise these parallel debates by reference to four views: panpsychism and cosmopsychism in the philosophy of mind, and polytheism and pantheism in the philosophy of religion.

Panpsychism says that phenomenality is everywhere. Pantheism says that divinity is everywhere. These views appear parallel initially and that is why they are often contrasted or conflated. I argue, however, that panpsychism is not exactly parallel to pantheism. We cannot derive pantheism merely by replacing phenomenality in panpsychism with divinity in pantheism. I argue that what we can derive by replacing phenomenality with divinity is (an extreme form of) polytheism. I argue that if, on the other hand, we replace divinity with phenomenality in pantheism we can derive cosmopsychism. I analyse the relationships between these four views in detail. I argue based on the analysis that we can develop a new way of undercutting the combination problem, which is widely considered the greatest challenge for panpsychism.

¹ For another attempt to bridge debates in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion by considering their parallel structures see my 2008 book *God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to the Knowledge Arguments*. In that book, I develop new responses to Thomas Nagel's bat argument and Frank Jackson's Mary argument in the philosophy of mind, both of which are directed against physicalism, by contrasting them with arguments against the existence of God in the philosophy of religion.

2. Relationships between Pantheism, Panpsychism, Polytheism and Cosmopsychism

Exactly how panpsychism should be defined is disputed. Some define it as a version of physicalism while others define it as a version of dualism or nonphysicalist monism such as Russellian monism. Yet others define it as a form of idealism.² I will not attempt to develop a precise definition of panpsychism or specify necessary and sufficient conditions for it in this essay. It does not make much difference here which form of panpsychism is correct because our discussion applies equally to most versions of panpsychism. We can start our discussion with the following broad formulation of panpsychism:

Panpsychism: Phenomenality is everywhere throughout the cosmos.

Classical panpsychists hold the radical view that mentality in general, which includes a broad range of items such as thought, cognition, emotion and consciousness, is everywhere throughout the cosmos. Yet many contemporary panpsychists hold a more modest thesis that *phenomenal properties* are everywhere throughout the cosmos. For our purposes in this essay it suffices to adopt the above formulation in terms of phenomenality rather than mentality in general.

Panpsychism is often compared or conflated with pantheism, which can be formulated as follows:

Pantheism: Divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos.

² For a variety of formulations of panpsychism see this volume and Brüntrup and Jaskolla (forthcoming).

One might wonder exactly what ‘divinity’ means here. I do not address this question in detail in this essay as it is a major question which philosophers of religion and theologians have disputed for centuries. It suffices for our purposes to assume somewhat imprecisely that something is divine if it is considered God or a god (but not another being—such as an angel—or the result of an act of God or a god).

The term ‘panpsychism’ originates from ‘panpsychia’, which the sixteenth-century Italian philosopher Francesco Patrizi applied to his view that God’s phenomenality is present throughout the cosmos. Hence, the first view that was labelled ‘panpsychism’ seems to be a version of pantheism. This is understandable given how similar panpsychism and pantheism initially appear. In Greek ‘pan’ means ‘all’, ‘psyche’ means ‘soul’ or ‘mind’, and ‘theos’ means ‘God’. Hence, panpsychism is the view that all is mind while pantheism is the view that all is God. If we replace ‘psyche’ with ‘theo’ in ‘panpsychism’ we obtain ‘pantheism’. Conversely, if we replace ‘theo’ with ‘psych’ in ‘pantheism’ we obtain ‘panpsychism’.

The relationship between panpsychism and pantheism has not been carefully discussed in the literature but, as we have seen, it is commonly assumed that panpsychism and pantheism are at least structurally parallel. I argue, however, that this is not correct. In what follows, I try to establish the following six relevant theses:

- (i) Panpsychism is not parallel to pantheism.
- (ii) Panpsychism is parallel to polytheism.
- (iii) Pantheism is parallel to cosmopsychism.
- (iv) Cosmopsychism is not parallel to polytheism.
- (v) Pantheism entails cosmopsychism but not vice versa
- (vi) Polytheism entails panpsychism but not vice versa

The relationships between these six theses can be illustrated by the following diagram.




Figure 1: Relationships between panpsychism, pantheism, polytheism, and cosmopsychism

(1) Panpsychism is not parallel to pantheism.

Again, panpsychism and pantheism are often thought to be parallel because panpsychism says that phenomenality is everywhere and pantheism says that divinity is everywhere. I submit, however, that they are radically distinct metaphysical views because the reason that panpsychism says that phenomenality is everywhere is fundamentally different from the reason that pantheism says that divinity is everywhere. Panpsychism says that phenomenality is everywhere throughout the cosmos because *everything in the cosmos* is phenomenal. On the other hand, pantheism says that divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos because *the cosmos as a whole* is divine. In other words, while the focus of panpsychism is on individual

things in the cosmos the focus of pantheism is on the cosmos as an entity in its own right. Panpsychism says that phenomenality is immanent and pantheism says that divinity is immanent but they reach these conclusions from different directions—indeed from the exact opposite directions.

(2) Panpsychism is parallel to polytheism.

If pantheism is not parallel to panpsychism, which view of divinity is parallel to panpsychism? Again, panpsychism says that phenomenality is everywhere throughout the cosmos because *everything in the cosmos* is phenomenal. This means that a parallel view of divinity would hold the following: Divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos because *everything in the cosmos* is divine. This is an extreme form of polytheism.

Polytheism is the view that there is more than one god. This means that polytheism negates the following two views: (a) atheism, according to which the number of gods is exactly zero; (b) monotheism, according to which the number of gods is exactly one. Polytheism says that the number of gods is two or more. Monotheism is accepted in such Abrahamic traditions as Christianity, Islam and Judaism, while polytheism is accepted in such Eastern traditions as Hinduism and Shinto. Polytheism in principle subsumes infinitely many views because it covers all views that hold that the number of God/gods is anything between two and infinite. The form of polytheism that we address here is an extreme one which says that everything in the cosmos is divine. If there are infinitely many things in the cosmos, according to this view, there are infinitely many gods. This extreme form of polytheism is structurally parallel to panpsychism. It holds that everything is divine in the same way as panpsychism holds that everything is phenomenal.

There can be more nuanced forms of panpsychism. For example, some panpsychists might narrow their focus and hold that only individual things in the cosmos that have specific

properties are phenomenal rather than that absolutely everything in the cosmos is phenomenal. This, however, does not undermine my claim that panpsychism and pantheism are structurally parallel because we can narrow (or widen) the scope of polytheism in the same way that we can narrow (or widen) the scope of panpsychism. For example, pantheists can hold the parallel thesis that only individual things in the cosmos that have specific properties are divine rather than that absolutely everything in the cosmos is divine. Having said that, in what follows, for the sake of simplicity, by the term ‘polytheism’ I refer to the extreme form of polytheism according to which everything in the cosmos is divine.

(3) Pantheism is parallel to cosmopsychism.

We have seen that panpsychism is not parallel to pantheism despite the apparent similarity. Which view of phenomenality then is parallel to pantheism? I submit that it is cosmopsychism. Pantheism says that divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos because the cosmos as a whole is divine. We can obtain cosmopsychism by replacing divinity in this thesis with phenomenality: phenomenality is everywhere throughout the cosmos because the cosmos as a whole is phenomenal. These two theses are clearly parallel. Among the four views that we address in this essay, cosmopsychism is probably the one that is least discussed in philosophy.

It is important to grasp what cosmopsychism is *not* because many views may seem similar to cosmopsychism. First, cosmopsychism is distinct from the ‘Gaia hypothesis’, which regards the Earth as a single organic living system (Lovelock 1979). While the focus of the Gaia hypothesis is on a specific planet, the Earth, the focus of cosmopsychism is on the cosmos as a whole. Moreover, while the Gaia hypothesis is formulated in terms of life, cosmopsychism is formulated in terms of consciousness. Cosmopsychism is also distinct from Richard Maruce Bucke’s theory of ‘cosmic consciousness’ (Bucke 1901). Bucke maintains that cosmic consciousness is a form of consciousness which is higher than the consciousness of ordinary

people but appears in some specific people of ‘good intellect’, such as Buddha and Christ. Contrary to cosmopsychists, Bucke does not attribute cosmic consciousness to the cosmos as a whole. Perhaps Bucke’s view is comparable to John Hick’s thesis of the Real, which I address below. Cosmopsychism is also distinct from Émile Durkheim’s view of ‘collective consciousness’ (Durkheim 1997, originally 1893). Collective consciousness is, according to Durkheim, a set of shared beliefs and sentiments that are common to people in a given society. Collective consciousness is broader than ordinary consciousness in its scope but it is not attributed to the cosmos as a whole. Perhaps cosmopsychism is most closely related to the theory of *anima mundi*, or the ‘world soul’, discussed in ancient Greek philosophy. In *Timaeus* 30b, Plato considers the world as a ‘living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God’. A version of cosmopsychism we discuss in this essay is formulated in terms of consciousness rather than soul and reason, but the attribution of mentality to the world as a whole in the theory of *anima mundi* is analogous to the attribution of phenomenality to the cosmos in cosmopsychism.

(4) Cosmopsychism is not parallel to polytheism.

I argued above that panpsychism is not parallel to pantheism because while the focus of panpsychism is on individual things in the cosmos the focus of pantheism is on the cosmos as a whole. Similarly, cosmopsychism is not parallel to polytheism because while the focus of cosmopsychism is on the cosmos as a whole the focus of polytheism is on individual things in the cosmos.

(5) Pantheism entails cosmopsychism but not vice versa

Again, pantheism holds that divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos because the cosmos as a whole is divine. Assuming that God has mental states with phenomenal properties, or,

more simply put, assuming that divinity entails phenomenality, pantheism entails the cosmopsychist thesis that the cosmos as a whole is phenomenal. It makes sense in this respect that Patrizi calls his pantheistic view panpsychism. This does not necessarily, however, mean that pantheism entails all versions of cosmopsychism because there can be a disagreement about the nature of the phenomenality in question. Pantheism is a form of theism so pantheists are likely to identify the phenomenality of the cosmos with the phenomenality of God.³ That is, they are likely to hold that the phenomenality in question corresponds to the consciousness or phenomenal states of the higher self. Yet some cosmopsychists might reject the existence of a higher self and postulate the phenomenality of the cosmos as a whole without assuming the self as its bearer. For example, some cosmopsychists might choose to attribute to the cosmos as a whole what Gregg Rosenberg calls ‘protoconsciousness’, which does not require a specific cognitive bearer, instead of full-blown consciousness, which does require it. According to Rosenberg, properties of protoconsciousness are, contrary to what Chalmers calls ‘protophenomenal properties’, themselves phenomenal. Rosenberg remarks, “In contrast with protophenomenal properties, the properties of protoconsciousness are phenomenal properties properly considered phenomenal, but they do not require an associated cognitive engine to be experienced” (Rosenberg 2004, p. 97). That is, according to Rosenberg, while properties of protoconsciousness are phenomenal on their own, they are not cognised by any subject. Having said that, we can set aside these details because they do not affect my overall argument.

³ By the claim that pantheism is a form of theism I mean that it postulates the existence of God, whether or not the pantheistic God is radically different from the God according to traditional theism. In characterising the uniqueness of pantheism in comparison with traditional theism, Michael Levine calls pantheism ‘nontheistic theism’ (Levine 1994, p. 3).

It should be noted that while pantheism entails cosmopsychism, cosmopsychism does not seem to entail pantheism. Even if, as cosmopsychism says, the cosmos as a whole is phenomenal it does not immediately follow from the pantheistic thesis that the cosmos as a whole is divine (unless there is a valid reason to think that the cosmos cannot be phenomenal without also being divine). It seems possible that the phenomenality in question is not divine.

(6) Polytheism entails panpsychism but not vice versa

To the extent that pantheism entails cosmopsychism, polytheism entails panpsychism. Polytheism says that divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos because everything in the cosmos is divine. Assuming that gods have mental states with phenomenal properties, or, more simply put, assuming that divinity entails phenomenality, polytheism entails the panpsychist thesis that everything in the cosmos is phenomenal. This does not, however, necessarily mean that polytheism entails all versions of panpsychism because there can be a disagreement about what the phenomenality in question is. Polytheism is a form of theism so polytheists are likely to identify the phenomenality of individual things in the cosmos with the phenomenality of gods. That is, they are likely to hold that the phenomenality in question corresponds to the consciousness or phenomenal states of selves. Yet some panpsychists might reject the existence of selves in everything and postulate the phenomenality of individual things in the cosmos without assuming selves as its bearers. For example, some panpsychists might choose to attribute to individual things in the cosmos the abovementioned protoconsciousness instead of full-blown consciousness. Having said that, we can once again set aside these details because they do not affect my overall argument.

It should be noted that while polytheism entails panpsychism, panpsychism does not seem to entail polytheism. (This is comparable to the fact that cosmopsychism does not seem to entail pantheism.) Even if, as panpsychism says, everything in the cosmos is phenomenal it

does not immediately follow from the polytheistic thesis that everything in the cosmos is divine (unless there is a valid reason to think that individual things in the cosmos cannot be phenomenal without also being divine). It seems possible that the phenomenality in question is not divine.

3. Are Pantheism and Polytheism Compatible?

Let us set aside the philosophy of mind for a moment and focus on the relationship between the two views in the philosophy of religion: pantheism and polytheism.

Again, pantheism says that divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos because the cosmos as a whole is divine, and polytheism says that divinity is everywhere throughout the cosmos because everything in the cosmos is divine. These two views seem completely distinct. While the focus of pantheism is on the cosmos as a whole the focus of polytheism is on individual things in the cosmos. Moreover, these two views appear to be incompatible. Pantheism is normally construed as a form of monotheism as it postulates the cosmos as a sole God. Polytheism, on the other hand, postulates more than one god, possibly infinitely many gods. It seems, therefore, that we cannot hold pantheism and polytheism simultaneously.

One might attempt to show that they are actually compatible. For example, one might purport to derive the pantheist thesis that the cosmos as a whole is divine from the polytheist thesis that everything in the cosmos is divine. Such a derivation, however, seems to commit the fallacy of composition. It seems to assume erroneously that we can always derive something that is true of the whole from something that is true of its parts. (Parallel example: It is fallacious to derive that the cosmos as a whole is small from the fact that parts of the cosmos are small.) Similarly, one might attempt to derive the polytheist thesis that everything in the cosmos is divine from the pantheist thesis that the cosmos as a whole is divine. Such a derivation, however, seems to commit a fallacy of decomposition. It seems to assume

erroneously that we can always derive something that is true of parts from something that is true of the whole. (Parallel example: It is fallacious to derive that parts of the cosmos are massive from the fact that the cosmos as a whole is massive.) With my philosopher-of-religion hat on, I am interested in discovering if there is a way to show that pantheism and polytheism are compatible.

John Hick's strategy for defending religious pluralism (2004, originally 1989) can be construed as an attempt to resolve the apparent incompatibility between pantheism (or monotheism more generally) and polytheism. Hick tries to resolve the apparent incompatibility by appealing to the notion of the 'Real', transcendental reality. He distinguishes 'the Real in itself' and 'the Real as humanly experienced' (or manifested within the intellectual and phenomenal purview of a certain tradition). Hick says that the Real in itself is 'transcategorical' or ineffable. That is, our limited human language and thought cannot grasp its true nature. Therefore, for example, number does not apply to the Real. Yet people from divergent religious or cultural traditions perceive the Real differently due to human limitations; people in a monotheistic tradition see the Real as a single divine being and call it God while people in a polytheistic tradition see it as many divine beings and call them gods. This does not mean that polytheism and monotheism (like pantheism) are fundamentally incompatible; their incompatibility is merely epistemic, not ontological.

I propose a new strategy to establish the compatibility between pantheism and polytheism. This strategy is distinct from Hick's strategy because, unlike Hick's, it is purely ontological. I mentioned above the claim that it is fallacious to derive properties of the whole from properties of its individual parts and to derive properties of individual parts from properties of the whole. But such derivations are not *always* fallacious. Suppose, for example, that there is a car that consists solely of parts that are thoroughly red. It is then right to infer that the car as a whole is thoroughly red. Suppose, to take another example, that there is a car

that is thoroughly red. It is then right to infer that every individual part of the car is thoroughly red. These inferences about the car and its parts are valid and do not commit the fallacies of composition or decomposition because we have added a premise in each case—that a car consists solely of parts that are thoroughly red in the first case and that a car is thoroughly red in the second case. Similarly, we can show that polytheism can entail pantheism or that pantheism can entail polytheism by introducing extra assumptions. In this way, we can avoid the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of decomposition. Again, pantheism says that the cosmos as a whole is divine and polytheism says that everything in the cosmos is divine. In order to show that polytheism and pantheism are compatible, we can add an extra assumption that the cosmos as a whole is divine *in virtue of everything in the cosmos being divine*. Here, the divinity of individual things in the cosmos is considered ontologically prior to the divinity of the cosmos as a whole. Let us call this approach the ‘bottom-up approach’ because it starts with the divinity of individual things in the cosmos and we derive the divinity of the cosmos as a whole from it. There can also be a ‘top-down approach’: In order to show that pantheism and polytheism are compatible, we can add an extra assumption that everything in the cosmos is divine *in virtue of the cosmos as a whole being divine*. Here, the divinity of the cosmos as a whole is considered ontologically prior to the divinity of individual things in the cosmos.

I do not have space to discuss whether either of the approaches ultimately succeeds. Nevertheless, they hint at a novel way of tackling an intractable problem in the philosophy of mind, which initially appears irrelevant to these approaches. The problem in question is the combination problem, which is widely considered the greatest challenge for panpsychism. I introduce the combination problem in the next section, and explain in Section 5 how we can utilise the above observation of the apparent incompatibility between pantheism and polytheism to undercut the combination problem.

4. The Combination Problem

The main reason for holding panpsychism is that it avoids the problem of strong emergence, which physicalism faces. This problem arises from the ‘unexpectedness’ of phenomenal properties: phenomenal properties are instantiated by physical things in the cosmos such as aggregates of neurons. This is unexpected and surprising because neurons seem to be fundamentally non-phenomenal. It seems impossible to explain how something that is phenomenal can be instantiated by an aggregate of something that is fundamentally non-phenomenal. Galen Strawson claims that the instantiation of phenomenal properties by wholly non-phenomenal properties is as implausible as the instantiation of spatial properties by wholly non-spatial properties (Strawson 2008, pp. 64–65).

Panpsychism avoids the problem of strong emergence by postulating that all physical things in the cosmos, or at least physical ultimates, are themselves phenomenal. That is, according to panpsychism, it is not surprising that phenomenal properties are instantiated by aggregates of neurons because physical ultimates, which constitute neurons and other relevant physical entities, are already phenomenal. That is, phenomenal properties of physical ultimates are fundamental phenomenal building blocks. According to panpsychism, therefore, ‘smaller’ phenomenal properties realised by physical ultimates are more fundamental than ‘larger’ phenomenal properties realised by the brain. (I use the terms ‘larger’ and ‘smaller’ metaphorically here.) Panpsychism is comparable to the abovementioned bottom-up approach for deriving pantheism from panpsychism. Panpsychism says that, because physical ultimates are phenomenal, certain larger objects constituted by them, such as an aggregate of neurons, if not the cosmos as a whole, are also phenomenal.

Panpsychism may succeed in responding to the problem of strong emergence but it pays a price. That is, it faces a difficult problem of its own: the combination problem. The combination problem arises from the apparent discrepancy between, on the one hand, a highly

complex, structured aggregate of neurons and, on the other hand, a smooth, uniform phenomenal experience such as a visual experience. The problem can be formulated as the following objection to panpsychism: Ordinary phenomenal experiences realised by the brain present themselves as smooth, continuous, and unified. They do have distinct aspects but they have an underlying homogeneity. According to panpsychism, however, all neurons instantiate phenomenal properties and our ordinary phenomenal experiences result from combinations of these properties. It is hard to see, however, how ‘smaller’ phenomenal properties of neurons could add up to manifest the homogeneous character of ‘larger’ phenomenal properties instantiated by the brain.⁴

The combination problem is widely recognised as the most intractable problem for panpsychism. David Chalmers, for example, contends that it “is certainly the hardest problem for any sort of Russellian view [which includes a version of panpsychism]” (Chalmers 1996, p. 307). William Seager regards it as “the most difficult problem facing any panpsychist theory of consciousness” (Seager 1995, p. 280). In the next section, I argue that the combination problem can be avoided by replacing panpsychism with cosmopsychism.

5. Cosmopsychism as a Way of Undercutting the Combination Problem

The combination problem arises because panpsychism is a bottom-up view. It regards ‘smaller’ phenomenal properties instantiated by physical ultimates to be ontologically prior to ‘larger’ phenomenal properties instantiated by the brain. The smoothness, uniformity and homogeneity

⁴ This problem is sometimes called the ‘grain problem’ or the ‘structural mismatch problem’. Some claim that there are several other versions of the combination problem. See Chalmers (forthcoming).

of the ‘larger’ phenomenal properties are lost on the panpsychist assumption that they are aggregates of ‘smaller’ consciousnesses instantiated by physical ultimates.

The combination problem does not arise, however, if we adopt cosmopsychism because it is a top-down view. Recall the top-down approach to deriving polytheism from pantheism discussed above. According to this approach, we can derive the divinity of individual things in the cosmos from the divinity of the cosmos as a whole by holding that the divinity of the cosmos as a whole is ontologically prior to the divinity of individual things in the cosmos. Similarly, we can adopt cosmopsychism and contend that the phenomenality of the cosmos as a whole entails the phenomenality of individual things in the cosmos by holding that the phenomenality of the cosmos as a whole is ontologically prior to the phenomenality of individual things in the cosmos.⁵ In the bottom-up approach of panpsychism, the ‘smaller’ consciousnesses are the more fundamental they are. The consciousnesses of physical ultimates are the ‘smallest’ and most fundamental, and any ‘larger’ consciousnesses are compositions of them. In the top-down approach of cosmopsychism, on the other hand, the ‘larger’ consciousnesses are the more fundamental they are. The consciousness of the cosmos is the ‘largest’ and most fundamental, and any ‘smaller’ consciousnesses are derivatives of it.

We can illustrate these points with an analogy. Suppose, *per impossibile*, there is an absolutely perfectly smooth painting, which is analogous to a smooth, homogeneous phenomenal experience instantiated by the brain. Such a painting cannot be an aggregate of small dots, which are analogous to phenomenal properties of physical ultimates. Yet it can well be a segment of a larger painting that is equally smooth and homogeneous, which is analogous

⁵ Similar points are made or anticipated by Philip Goff (forthcoming), Ludwig Jaskolla and Alexander Buck (2012), Freya Mathews (2011) and Nagasawa and Wager (forthcoming) but the metaphysical grounds of their views differ radically from each other.

to phenomenal properties of the cosmos as a whole. We face the combination problem in the bottom-up approach of panpsychism because we try to derive the ‘larger’ consciousness instantiated by the brain (an absolutely perfectly smooth painting) from the ‘smaller’ consciousness of physical ultimates (small dots). But we do not face the same problem if we try to derive the consciousness instantiated by the brain (an absolutely perfectly smooth painting) from the ‘larger’ consciousness of the cosmos as a whole (a larger painting that is equally perfectly smooth).

One might claim, however, that cosmopsychism still fails to respond to the following problem, which I call the ‘derivation problem’: How could the consciousnesses of individuals like us be derived from the consciousness of the cosmos as a whole? It is not easy to respond to the derivation problem because we do not know the exact nature of the consciousness of the cosmos. Yet we can speculate about how we might be able to respond to the problem. It is reasonable to assume that the consciousness of the cosmos is somewhat comparable to the consciousnesses of individuals because, after all, it is a form of consciousness. If we can then show that the consciousnesses of individuals can be divided into ‘smaller’, less fundamental segments, then we have reason to think that the consciousness of the cosmos can also be divided into ‘smaller’, less fundamental segments. And it seems indeed possible to divide the consciousnesses of individuals into ‘smaller’ segments.

Consider, for example, a visual experience. A visual experience can be considered a unity which may be segmented into distinguishable colour experiences (e.g., experiences corresponding to red and green hues) or experiences of separable regions in space (e.g., experiences corresponding to the right-hand side and the left-hand side of the visual field). Yet the whole visual experience is considered a unity which is ontologically prior to the segments. Perhaps the consciousness of the cosmos relates itself to ‘smaller’ consciousnesses, such as consciousnesses instantiated by the brain, in a comparable way. The consciousness of the

cosmos is ontologically prior to the consciousnesses of individuals, so it is not the case that the consciousnesses of individuals are building blocks of the consciousness of the cosmos. On the contrary, smooth, continuous and unified consciousnesses of individuals are derived or segmented from the smooth, continuous and unified consciousness of the cosmos. Hence, it seems reasonable to think that cosmopsychism can answer the derivation problem.⁶

Cosmopsychism would not be attractive if it entailed that we have to give up the virtues of panpsychism. As mentioned earlier, the main virtue of panpsychism is that it provides a successful answer to the problem of strong emergence confronting physicalism. Again, the problem is concerned with the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of explaining how phenomenal properties can be instantiated by aggregates of neurons, which are fundamentally non-phenomenal. The problem arises for physicalism because physicalism adopts the bottom-up approach and holds that things on the fundamental, bottom level are physical, that is, non-phenomenal. While panpsychism adopts the bottom-up approach too, it avoids the problem by holding that things on the fundamental, bottom level are phenomenal rather than physical. Panpsychism says that it is not surprising that the brain can instantiate phenomenal properties because neurons, which are ontologically prior to the brain according to the bottom-up approach, are already phenomenal. Cosmopsychism avoids the problem of strong emergence in a unique way. It puts everything upside down and adopts the top-down, rather than bottom-up, approach. It holds that the problem does not arise because things on the fundamental, *top* level are phenomenal. According to cosmopsychism, it is not surprising that the brain can instantiate phenomenal properties because the cosmos as a whole, which is ontologically prior to the brain according to the top-down approach, is already phenomenal. Whether the

⁶ See Nagasawa and Wager (forthcoming) for a more thorough defence of this idea.

fundamental level is on the top or bottom of reality, if things on the fundamental level are phenomenal the problem of strong emergence does not arise.

In sum: Physicalism faces the problem of strong emergence. Panpsychism avoids the problem of strong emergence but it faces the combination problem. Cosmopsychism is an attractive alternative because it avoids both the problem of strong emergence and the combination problem.

6. Conclusion

We have compared and discussed the relationships between four views: panpsychism, cosmopsychism, polytheism and pantheism. The relationship between panpsychism and cosmopsychism is comparable to the relationship between polytheism and pantheism. I have argued that polytheism and pantheism can be compatible because there is a way to derive polytheism from pantheism and vice versa. By utilising the top-down approach to derive polytheism from pantheism I have developed a way of avoiding the combination problem. I have argued that we can avoid the combination problem if we endorse cosmopsychism in conjunction with the top-down approach, according to which the consciousness of the cosmos is ontologically prior to the consciousnesses of individuals like us. I have also argued that cosmopsychism does not sacrifice the main virtue of panpsychism; it undermines the problem of strong emergence to the same extent that panpsychism does.⁷

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